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Those who use stakeholder theory as a reference are both underlining the correlation between facts and a 
certain conceptualisation thereof (Section 1) and trying to make the necessary shift from a  “panoptic” 
analysis akin to a panoramic vision of texts and positions (Section 2) to an “in-depth” one geared towards 
an understanding of their foundations (Section 3). As a “theory of organisations”, stakeholder theory helps 
to nourish a relational model of organisations by revisiting questions about “who” is actually working with 
(and in) the firm. Stakeholder theory is part of a comprehensive project that views the organisation-group 
relationship as both a foundation and a norm. 
 




Stakeholder theory has become the focal point of a great many debates. It frequently serves as a point of 
reference in agents’ discourses, in their acts and in a host of “management science” studies (and even 
political analyses). Its current tendency is to impose itself as a point of reference by imitating corporate 
social responsibility policies, to such an extent that it has taken on the allures of a dominant discourse. 
 
This explains the proliferation of false arguments currently circulating on this subject. The purpose of the 
present text will be to recall those elements of comprehension that are a requisite in any references to 
stakeholder theory, and to suggest elements of evaluation. The question we ultimately ask is whether it is 
because of stakeholder theory’s apparent facility that it is so pleasing – even though its false evidence may 
in fact be masking ambiguities that could lead many analysts astray, whether or not they lend any 
credence to this school of thought. 
 
This theory constitutes a core issue in “pseudo” disputes today, a state of affairs attesting to the status of 
“the serious thing” that is the firm, and translating the existence of an American intellectualism in the field 
of management sciences. Texts derived from such discussions have gone forth and multiplied, filling up 
our libraries with cross-references and book synopses, and with “reviewers” and alternatively “reviewees” 
happy to join one or the other of the categories underpinning this construction of “academic capitalism”. 
In truth, the very same criticism can also be made of the present text, even though its ambition is to 
position the elements needed to “decode” stakeholder theory at a level beyond the evidential one that 
would appear to be its lot. 
 
The very expression “stakeholder” has become so widespread today that many pundits have forgotten that 
it first arose in the United States as a liberal reaction (remember that what our American friends call 
“liberal” is what we would call oppositional) to the primacy being bestowed upon financial  value, led by 
the figure of the shareholder – a primacy that became legitimate during President Reagan’s time in office. 
Here it is worth remembering the operation suggested by P. Ricoeur (1997) in the title of his book devoted 
to questions of ideology: u topia asks questions where ideology legitimises, in which case stakeholder 
theory plays the role of a utopia. However, P. Ricoeur also warns us against the way in which utopia is co-
opted by ideology. This is yet another issue we will have to deal with, gi ven stakeholders’ presence inside 
of the old managerial utopia of agonism
1 i.e., the utopia of refusing to recognise the existence of 
antagonisms in the firm. Workers, shareholders, we’re all in it together! 
 
                                                                   
1 The expression “agonism” derives from the term “antagonism” and indicates a lesser degree of opposition. 
Corresponding to the enemy (antagonism) is the figure of the adversary (agonism). As such, agonism sketches the 
contours of a society (or of an organisation for our present purposes) in which the quest for consensus has replaced 








































7Note first of all the speed with which this corpus has developed, as witnessed by the proliferation of 
articles and conferences on this subject. Academic research has reserved a special place for stakeholder 
theory over the past few years. According to T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston (1995), more than 100 articles 
and a dozen books have been devoted to this topic, with most having been published in reviews like 
Business Ethics Quarterly and  Academy o f Management Review. However, when taken out of its 
American cultural context, the stakeholder concept becomes a relatively vague one. It benefits from an 
“imperialist” effect relating both to the fact that it belongs to the field of management sciences and also to 
its American origins. The idea here is management sciences are so indebted to American sources that it 
might as well accept the stakeholder construct without any further do... Yet culturalist understanding is 
rich with potential. Stakeholder theory could be construed as existing along the same lines of 
understanding as those that we inherited from Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), with his vision of American 
democracy and its “ heritage of pious merchants” whose interests can best be seen in the light of their 
“moral equality”. It may also be congruent with the vision that Max Weber described in 1904 when 
commenting on Benjamin Franklin’s 1748 opus, Advice to a Young Tradesman. What we should not 
forget is the absence of this figure of the Tradesman (or of his more generic version, the Businessman) in 
Continental Europe, where the Bourgeois was much more of a reference point. 
 
According to S. Mercier (1999), stakeholders are “all of the agents for whom the firm’s development and 
good health are of prime concern”. E. R. Freeman (1984) defines them as “any group or individual that 
can affect or be affected by the realisation of a company’s objectives”. Ethical considerations are what 
have driven stakeholder theory’s rise, having been deployed as a way of constructing its normative aspect 
(the idea being that we are all stakeholders). 
 
For T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston (1995), stakeholders are defined by their legitimate interest in an 
organisation. This implies that: 
-  Claimants are groups or persons with  legitimate interests; that they are known; and that they have 
been identified: 
-  All stakeholder groups’ interests have at least a modicum of intrinsic value. 
 
Nowadays (A. Caroll, 1989) we usually distinguish between:  
-  “Primary” stakeholders, referring  to those actors who entertain a direct and contractually 
determined relationship, as the name indicates, with the company (and who are sometimes still 
called “contractual” stakeholders). 
-  “Secondary” stakeholders, combining actors who are situated at the  borders of a firm and who 
may be impacted by its actions without having any contractual connection to it (a group that is 
still described as “diffuse” sometimes).  
 
Other distinctions exist as well, including between internal stakeholders; “traditional” external ones; and 
other external ones with the power to influence matters. I. Pelle Culpin offers a further distinction (1998) 
between institutional stakeholders (those involved in laws, regulations, inter-organisational entities, plus 
professional organisations that may be specific to a given industry); economic stakeholders (actors 
operating in the markets of the company in question); and “ethical” stakeholders emanating from ethical 
and political pressure groups (a group whose figuration may be more difficult to define). 
 
Those who use stakeholder theory as a reference are both underlining the correlation between facts and a 
certain conceptualisation thereof (Section 1) and trying to make the necessary shift from a  “panoptic” 
analysis akin a panoramic vision of texts and positions (Section 2) to an “in-depth” one geared towards an 
understanding of their foundations and highlighting its ambiguities (Section 3).  
 









































7As indicated by F. Lépineux (2003), stakeholder theory sprang out of a maelstrom of “affairs”. In 1967, 
community groups in the United States invited themselves to an Eastman Kodak AGM against a backdrop 
of racial tension and mass unemployment amongst Greater Cleveland’s black population. In the United 
States again, consumer organisations invited themselves to a General Motors’ 1970 AGM to complain 
about safety defects on the cars being sold, and to ask other questions about Group social practices. The 
grilling of GM’s Board of Directors received a great deal of media airtime. Both of these “generating 
facts” attest to the significance that executives in these large companies attached to the “societal” 
dimension, and to shareholder activism’s potential for criticism. 
 
In Great Britain in 1997, several shareholders began to ask questions about the political nature of Shell’s 
relationships with the Nigerian government of the time, thereby highlighting a whole series of human 
rights and environmental protection issues. This “affair” is considered the starting point for stakeholder 
governance, i.e., for the emergence of shareholder activism. 
 
1.1. Stakeholders and corporate governance  
 
Facts of this ilk (some of which are still imbued with a symbolic dimension) are the forces that gave birth 
to the  shareholder capitalism-stakeholder capitalism debate for which stakeholder theory has been a 
bedrock (M. Friedman, 1970; M. C. Jensen, 2002). Corporate governance issues highlight any and all 
relationships that may exist between a firm and its partners. In other words, they have contributed greatly 
to the development of stakeholder theory’s practical aspects. 
 
1.2. Counting all stakeholders  
 
The stakeholder issue raises questions about how such parties are to be counted. F. Lépineux (2003) 
suggests classifying them into different categories of actors: shareholders; internal stakeholders 
(employees; labour unions focused on issues such as employees’ direct and indirect participation [via their 
pension funds] in the firm’s capital structure, and on issues pertaining to union representation and/or to a 
shareholder activism that can be implemented either working alone or else with other investors who also 
want to get their resolutions adopted); operational partners (customers; suppliers [including 
subcontractors]; banks acting as creditors but also as parties that expect stability and solvency; and 
insurance companies having to contend with classes of risk currently undergoing a substantive and in-
depth renewal, i.e. “greater” catastrophes related w ith climatic changes today); the social community 
(State authorities; specialised organisations like trade unions; Non-Governmental Organisations; and civil 
society). For this latter category, NGO interventions were what first triggered the current debate. One 
example is the denunciation of the environmental spoliation being caused by oil, mineral and chemical 
companies, etc. (air and water pollution, deforestation, toxic waste, etc.). Well-publicised trials by media 
have progressively mutated into greater collaboration with the companies involved. Modern NGOs unite a 
host of different entities that can be quite disparate in nature, both in terms of their scope and also as 
regards their geographic reach (with the largest ones being structured into international networks). 
Moreover, their areas of competency have expanded from green issues in the 1980s to include human 
rights now, such as these are conceived of by the “stakeholder” concept using the ethical and political 
precepts it tries to apply. 
 
1.3. The ambiguity of “social community” when seen as something “singular” or “plural” 
 
The American construct of “community” is often mentioned as one of the stakeholders in regards to which 
firms are supposed to behave responsibly. S. A. Waddock & M. E. Boyle (1995) noted a shift in focus 
from relationships geared towards a single (close) community, towards more complex relationships with a 
multitude of communities that can be both close and more distant. This shift has led to greater reliance on 








































7Altman, 2000) in such a way as to account for the multiplicity of groups concerned whilst covering 
whatever they may have in common amongst themselves (as well as the modalities for managing such 
relationships). 
 
1.4. Stakeholders’ changing action modes 
 
F. Lépineux tried to classify these relationships in 2003 by distinguishing between: 
-  The shift from dialogue to partnership (i.e., NGO representatives’ presence in decision-making 
processes and/or the acquisition of shares so as to have the right to question executives at AGMs – 
all portrayed as shareholder activism in full flow); and 
-  The proliferation of the sorts of instruments of pressure that can be brought to bear within a 
conflictual context, including suggesting resolutions at AGMs, hijacking a company’s 
communications resources (“right-wrong” websites, counter-advertising, etc.) opinion-shaping 
campaigns, organising boycotts and lawsuits. 
 
But stakeholder theory is different from a mere classification exercise. As shown by an analysis of the 
texts comprising this school of thought, it is in fact a plan to rearrange the theory of organisations by 
incorporating ethical perspectives or, if one prefers, by enhancing said theory. 
 
2. A “panoptic” analysis of stakeholder theory 
 
Before suggesting any investigations of the field covered by stakeholder theory, we should remember its 
postulates: 
-  An organisation will maintain relationships with several groups that affect or are affected by its 
decisions (E. R. Freeman, 1984). 
-  Theory will be dependent on the nature of such relationships because of the way in which the 
processes involved and the outcomes achieved can affect society and stakeholders. 
-  Stakeholders’ interests have some intrinsic value, but no one interest should be able to dominate 
all of the others (M.B. Clarkson, 1995; T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston, 1995). 
-  Theory is interested in managerial decisions (T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston, 1995). 
 
In regards to the concept of (corporate social) responsibility, stakeholder theory has two variants: 
-  The first relates to the empirical nature of responsibility. Theory here is based on the idea that an 
organisation’s interests are the first to be taken into account, and that its subsequent efforts are 
then “divided” up amongst its various stakeholders in a way reflecting their respective levels of 
importance. Here information is seen as a crucial element allowing the organisation to “manage” 
its relationships: at the very least to avoid stakeholder opposition; and where possible to gain their 
adherence. 
-  The second relates to the organisation-stakeholders relationship, conceived of here as a social 
relationship implying the genesis of an organisation’s responsibility to its stakeholders. This is a 
normative approach to responsibility. 
 
The article by T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston (1995) offers a taxonomy of the different stakeholder theories 
by placing them into three separate categories. Based on the following elements, this taxonomy has served 
ever since as a benchmark for this field: 
-  Firms and managers act with moral perspectives in mind (Category 1, which is normative). 
-  Achieving results becomes more doable if managers act with moral perspectives in mind (Category 
2, which is empirical and instrumental). 
-  Organisations and managers behave with specifiable moral perspectives in mind (Category 3, which 









































7T. M. Jones & A. C. Wicks (1999) think that this typology helps to delineate the intellectual areas that are 
covered by stakeholder theory’s two founding schools: the empirical stakeholder theory (based on 
descriptive and instrumental perspectives); and the normative theory (based on ethics).  Hence their 
suggestion,  above and beyond the aforementioned “disputes”, of a “convergent” stakeholder theory 
predicated on the following arguments: 
-  Postulates: organisations operate publicly in an economic marketplace that can be described as 
competitive; decisions are taken by professional managers; and behaviours are contingent (on 
circumstances and contexts). 
-  Theory focuses on the manager-stakeholder relationship, which is deemed to have moral 
foundations. 
-  At the same time, theory is also empirical and normative since it offers practical results, i.e., 
describable norms. 
 
It remains that this perspective has been criticised as lacking in formal construction or empirically testable 
variables  (T. Donaldson, 1999; L. K. Trevino & R. W. Gray, 1999)  
 
Another distinction traverses this corpus (R. K. Mitchell et al., 1997) between those who refer to 
stakeholders as representives of a moral or economic interest  (with “ diffuse” stakeholders not necessarily 
entering the equation). 
 
2.1. Is stakeholder theory empirical in nature ? 
 
This initial question requires first of all a precise delineation of the framework that surrounds stakeholder 
theory in its two variants.  
 
2.1.1. Descriptive stakeholder theory 
 
This is the thesis that T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston put forward in 1995. In their opinion, this theory 
considers that organisation is what one finds at the centre of cooperation and competition situations, each 
of which possesses its own intrinsic value.  
 
Here the theory is being used to describe (and sometimes to explain) specific characteristics and 
behaviours, including for example firms’ nature (S. N. Brenner & P. Cochran, 1991), how executives’ 
management of their firms should be conceived of (S.N. Brenner & E. A. Molander, 1977), how some 
organisations are actually being managed (W.E. Halal, 1990; M. B. Clarkson, 1991; E .P. Kreiner & A. 
Bhambri, 1991), the diffusion of societal information ( A. Ullmann, 1995; I. Pelle Culpin, 1998), the 
notion of target stakeholders (R. K. Mitchell et al, 1997) and the significance attributed to each 
stakeholder, something that will vary depending on the phase that a firm has reached in its lifecycle (I. M. 
Jawahar & G. L. Mclaughin, 2001).  
 
This descriptive approach only allows for exploratory propositions, however. It does not enable any 
connection to be made between stakeholder management and traditional business objectives (growth, 
earnings, etc. ). 
 
2.2.2.  Instrumental stakeholder theory 
 
Instrumental stakeholder theory was advanced by T. M. Jones in 1995 . The main idea here is that 
everything else being equal, firms that practice stakeholder  management will perform better in 
profitability, stability, growth, etc. terms. One accepts that “certain” results can be obtained if “certain” 
behaviours are adopted. In other words, the instrumental theory is a contingent one (meaning that it 









































Several recent studies have referred to the instrumental theory implicitly or explicitly by using 
conventional statistical methodologies focused on: 
-  The relationship between the pressure that stakeholders can bring to bear and the way in which 
strategy is formulated (G. Weaver et al., 1999), 
-  The relationship between social and financial performance (P. L. Cochran & R. A. Wood, 1984; 
B. Cornell & A. C. Shapiro, 1987; S. L. Barton et al., 1989; G. B. Mc Guine et al., 1988; L. E. 
Preston & H. J. Sapienza, 1990; L. E. Preston et al., 1991). 
 
Due to the diverse nature of the outcomes obtained, however, no clear relationship in one direction or the 
other can be affirmed. 
 
2.2. Is stakeholder theory normative in nature ? 
 
T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston (1995) also stress stakeholder theory’s normative bases. In their opinion, this 
perspective is distinct from the functionalism found in empirical theory. Instead of compiling data and 
using ad hoc quantitative methods to test hypotheses, the focus here is on normative outcomes, hence on 
specifying the moral obligations found beneath stakeholders’ positions. What the various approaches of 
this kind have in common is the fact that they treat stakeholders both as an end and also as having interests 
that possess an intrinsic value. 
 
The narrative interpretation also characterises the normative perspective by offering narrative 
representations of firms’ moral behaviour. Here emphasis is placed on the ethical obligations a firm faces, 
and on how it can satisfy them without denying its interest in achieving economic success. A further goal 
is that of explaining how it is that the objectives being pursued by the actors themselves (by the 
stakeholders and by the organisation) can be mutually reinforcing. 
 
Researchers adhering to this school of thought will try to uncover the “best” alternative so as to steer 
corporate activities in ethically more constructive directions. They aver that individuals will modify the 
language they use (expressing conceptual schemes through images and metaphors) depending on how they 
think and act. In other words, actors’ underlying representations will influence the individual conceptions 
via which “reasonable” strategic actions are developed.  
 
Such studies entertain close relationships with the search for paradigms found beneath the interpretative 
theory of organisations, which affirms that individuals will build and maintain their own organisational 
realities at the social and symbolic levels. 
 
2.3. How are the different stakeholder theory approaches related? 
 
The typology we have just presented can be criticised as being derived from a positivism whereby it is 
assumed that descriptive theory will tell us how the world really is; that normative theory will prescribe 
how it should be; and that instrumental theory will indicate the shape we can give to it. 
 
The main points of divergence between the two theoretical perspectives are as follows: 
-  Stakeholder theory’s descriptive side reflects and explains the past, present and future. It tends to 
generate exploratory and predictive propositions, whereas instrumental precepts try to apprehend 
the connection between stakeholder approaches and mutually beneficial outcomes such as 
profitability. The instrumental approach is generally used to explore the relationship between 
causes (the management of stakeholders) and effects (organisational performance). Normative 
theory tries to study these relations based on their ethical aspects and philosophical principles. In 








































7one needs to adopt [or not to adopt] principles and practices “Y”), whereas the normative 
approach is categorical rather than hypothetical (doing or not doing something because it is the 
right [or wrong] thing). Hence the qualifier of “Kantian capitalism” given to some of its avatars. 
-  Depending on the point of reference being used, there may be some disagreement about T. 
Donaldson & L. E. Preston’s typology (1995). In an interpretative perspective, there is nothing 
automatic about the empirical -normative distinction (for instance, what is the interpretation based 
on?). Furthermore, certain “normative” studies affirm that moral behaviour has no need of being 
justified, since morality possesses its own innate merits. Such studies consider that the biggest 
contribution of the instrumental theory’s habitual variant is that it allows for the prediction of 
certain forms of moral behaviour will be sanctioned in the end, even though this may not occur in 
the short or medium term. 
-  “Narrative” modes seem unable to achieve the status of  “good research”, even if one does accept 
that it is possible to derive acceptable theory from narrative representations. After all, how does 
one distinguish between “good” and “bad” representations given that theoretical representations of 
this sort spring from their narrators’ own imaginary worlds? 
-  T. M. Jones & A. C. Wicks (1999) believe that “good” theory must help individuals to lead “better 
lives” within organisations. The question here is whether one should in fact validate the idea that 
narrative representations do actually help people to lead “better lives” in the absence of any 
empirical verification for this proposition. 
-  The interpretative theory contrasts with attempts to give higher marks to studies that try to create 
consensual paradigms. 
 
G. R. Weaver and L. K. Trevino (1994) have suggested a hierarchy of interactions between empirical and 
normative theoretical perspectives based on three different conceptions: parallelism; symbiosis; and 
integration. This perspective is grounded in two main ideas. The first is practical in nature and refers to 
stylistic and methodological differences amongst different empirical and normative requirements. The 
second is conceptual and involves theoretical conceptions and hypotheses, mainly as regards human 
behaviour, which is portrayed as being mechanistic in the empirical approach and autonomous and 
responsible in the normative one:  
-  For conceptual and practical reasons, parallelism rejects any connection between the empirical 
and the normative. In a sense, the only items that the two perspectives have in common are a 
“certain” interest in “certain” types of behaviour. There is no connection between the two, 
however. Empirical research is carried out without any reference to philosophical, ethical or 
religious developments. The opposite holds true as well. 
-  Symbiosis signifies that the two perspectives (empirical and normative) feed into one another but 
remain distinct in terms of their theoretical  principles, methodologies and hypotheses. A 
symbiosis principle is conducive to the existence of at least a modicum of agreement in given 
areas, i.e., in addition to both approaches’ interest in the same area of research they also share 
certain values and explanations. The shared values include the idea that stakeholders’ demands do 
possess some intrinsic merit, and that egotism is to be rejected since it is impossible for an 
individual or an organisation to serve its own purposes and nothing else. Interest in others is 
therefore a norm that the two theories share. This theme has been covered in several studies 
including the debate on corporate social responsibility (T. M. Jones, 1995), the moral debat (A. 
Konrad, 1982), “Kantian capitalism” (W. M. Evan & R. E. Freeman, 1983; N. Bowie, 1994), 
feminist approaches and property (T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston, 1995) and agents’ morality (D. 
Quinn & T. M. Jones, 1995). Regarding the compatibility between morality and capitalism, the 
two aforementioned values do not intimate that acting in one’s own interest necessarily constitutes 
something suspicious. What is suspicious however is the strict search for profit. A “reasonable” 
consensus exists around the idea that if capitalism is to be in good health it will require a 
“modicum” of morality. There is only partial agreement on these values, however. Normative 








































7source of this morality has long been a topic of heated philosophical debate. Empirical and 
normative studies also share certain general explanations. T. M. Jones & A. C. Wicks (1999) 
believe a consensus exists that it is unlikely that descriptive theory will develop much further in 
the short run. They also consider economic theories’ opportunism hypotheses as being much too 
simplistic. Elements like irrationality, altruism, generosity, cooperation, trust, honesty, interest in 
others, etc. are just as typical a characteristic of human behaviour. Lastly, there is widespread 
conviction that those organisations that focus on stakeholders and behave in a socially responsible 
manner perform better than those that only seek financial gain. 
-  Integration signifies that the two perspectives can be seen as belonging to one and  the same 
theoretical framework; and that they manifest themselves via the importing of concepts (with one 
approach evoking concepts found in the conceptual framework of the other), theoretical 
reciprocity (incorporation of both empirical and normative theory in one and the same study) and 
theoretical unity (rejection of distinctions between the empirical and the normative at the 
methodological and meta-theoretical levels). Authors from this school consider that all theory is 
incomplete when it is exclusively empirical or normative in nature. Methodologies and hypotheses 
can be combined if such an action is grounded in a partial consensus driven by whatever points 
are shared by the different components involved. Integration leads to a recognition of empirical 
theory’s normative foundations (principles of mutual trust and cooperation), thereby increasing 
their credibility. It remains that integration has been sharply criticised by E. R. Freeman (1999) as 
being incapable of avoiding the deontologism-consequentialism debate. 
 
Stakeholder theory also contains ambiguities that an in-depth exam should be able to reveal..  
 
3. An in-depth analysis of stakeholder theory 
 
Despite its ostensible facility and “false” evidences, stakeholder theory was born in correlation to the 
“liberal moment” of the 1980s and is therefore rooted in the developments of the philosophical school of 
thought that we can call “neo-liberal”. It is with regards to the various categories that make up this 
particular school that we can offer the modalities for a comprehensive and “in-depth” analysis, once we 
have taken all necessary precautions against the “exoticism” that one needs to mention when referring to 
this particular corpus. Indeed, i t appears to be entirely unacceptable for an analyst to make any remarks 
whatsoever regarding stakeholder theory without simultaneously commenting upon its presuppositions, 
grounded as they are in the pragmatic foundations of this particular school of philosophy. The authors 
themselves recognise this affiliation (at least T. Donaldson, K. Goodpaster and E. R. Freeman do). Didn’t 
they all used to study philosophy? 
 
R. Phillips, E. R. Freeman & A. C. Wicks (2003) have been forced to express themselves on the incorrect 
usages being made of this theory. Amongst other things, they have affirmed that it constitutes an ethical 
theory of organisations - a point of view to which we will return at the end of our argument, albeit in 
regards to other elements. The analysis we are pursuing here is based on arguments that are quite different 
from the ones put forward by these two authors. 
 
This is because the theory is not actually a contractualist one. It is born in American “neo-liberal” 
philosophical perspectives whose  central purpose is to develop a theory of justice. The stakeholder 
concept can be seen as referring to a communitarian perspective, with the stakeholder thereby helping to 
define the contours of a group to which actors can belong on a non-exclusionary basis.  Indeed, this is 
what constitutes the theory’s wealth and its ambiguity. A citizen can simultaneously be a customer, 
shareholder, employee and a “diffuse” stakeholder. Analysis of his/her position should be organised in 
terms of the category (defined by the particular type of search for fairness involved) that is relevant to the 









































73.1. “False evidence” in stakeholder theory 
 
The first false evidence in stakeholder theory relates to its ostensibly descriptive status, which may justify 
using a “Mintzberg complex” (1999) to qualify this theoretical perspective. In much the same way as 
organisations that used to live “happily” before it came along allegedly suddenly turned into adhocracies 
or professional bureaucracies, now they are deemed to have become the central foci for stakeholders! In 
which case it is possible to assert that stakeholder theory is merely a reformulation of the old introductory 
lesson in corporations and partners, this time around using an ostensibly more “modern” discourse. This 
viewpoint raises questions about the not always very obvious dichotomy that is said to exist between the 
theory’s descriptive usage (does it create better descriptions?) and its normative usage (are we all 
stakeholders or else destined to turn into one?). A further usage is supposedly found in the strategy 
categories. This involves an intermediary expression that one can apply in its vaguest connotation, with 
the stakeholder reference being seen as something enabling a superior formulation of strategy (or strategic 
discourse). The idea here is that stakeholder theory serves to reinvigorate functionalism by not answering 
any questions about what it is that constitutes an organisation’s actual foundations. What we would then 
be dealing with is an organisational metaphor that is ideological in scope. Simplification and incantation 
would be some of the traits of this construct, which is capable of specifying “friendly” or “enemy” factors 
at both the conceptual and the “real” levels (this being the place where we uncover one aspect of its 
embeddedness in pragmaticism). 
 
The second false evidence pertains to the possible merger between stakeholder theory and “the new 
theories of the firm”. C. W. L. Hill & T. M. Jones (1992) see the former as being generalised throughout 
the different categories of agency theory, in the sense that they focus mainly on the stakeholder-manager 
relationship. In this sort of “forced” contractualist perspective, managers are depicted as agents, whereas 
stakeholders are distinguished from one another on the basis of their importance and power vis-à-vis 
managers. When reinterpreted thusly, agency relationship involves, in accord with market “mechanisms” 
and the ingredients comprising its logic, a balancing of interests. E. R. Freeman & W. M. Evan (1990) 
integrated stakeholder theory into the transaction cost theory that R. H. Coase (1937) and O. E. 
Williamson (1985) had developed based on the assertion that managers are there to “manage” contracts 
with employees, owners, suppliers, customers, communities, etc., with a view towards developing “fair 
contracts” that should be analysed as the necessary moral precondition before the different parties can 
commit themselves. Since all parties have an equal right to sign contracts, any group is capable of 
investing in specific transactions that might affect the other groups, but in so doing the goal should remain 
that of developing a mode that enables conflict resolution and safeguards the rights of all committed 
parties. Here the concept of “ fairness” becomes a key benchmark since it is based on the normative 
perspectives that are inherent to human behaviour. T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston (1995) tried to connect 
stakeholder theory to property rights theory to justify the idea of getting property rights categories to 
represent the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. The main difficulty here is how to connect 
different stakeholders by means of property rights that have been reduced to their formal dimension, and 
to do this within a distributive justice perspective. Remember that distributive justice is a key concept in 
modern neo-liberal philosophy, with its reference to L. C. Becker (1992) and especially J. Rawls (1987). 
The reference to L. C. Becker seem particularly strange given the fact that many “much more” important 
philosophies have already dealt with this question. This reference was primarily chosen in an attempt to 
devise a property theory that can be correlated with stakeholder theory (so that each stakeholder can be 
allocated legal rights and formal property rights). E. R. Freeman has in fact already validated this stance 
(1994). C.M. Jensen severely criticised stakeholder theory in this respect, however (2000), when he 
complained that it does not allow for a sufficiently objective substantiation of a company’s mission, and 
that it provides an excuse for executive opportunism. 
 
It remains that these attempts to connect stakeholder theory to “the new theories of the firm” have 








































7-  The market efficiency postulate, since the normative foundation of stakeholders’ interests leads to 
their being recognised as possessing social “depth”, in turn disturbing the “purity” of the 
economic signals being diffused; 
-  The normative perspective, which is not in tune with the methodological individualism postulate; 
-  Inter-individual contractualism is replaced by a categories-based contractualism that imbues it 
with a metaphorical dimension. 
 
The third false evidence relates to the theory’s psychological aspect and is part of a drive to refuse 
egotistical subjects and to accept more reflective ones that are merely expressing a desire that they may 
have. In referring to a “generic” subject, however, the theory is seeking less of a footing in neo-liberal 
perspectives (particularly those found in an ultra-liberalism predicated upon the bestowal of radical 
primacy upon individuals, and therefore on the proliferation of rights that can be valued in a “market”). 
Instead, it is sinking roots into a civic type of republicanism (belief in the existence of a “common good” 
that adapts stakeholder interests so they can encompass “civic virtues”; plus a denunciation of deviations 
like the type of corruption that is caused by a conflict of interests – this being the place where we spill 
over into governance questions). 
 
The fourth false evidence relates to its sociological aspect. Stakeholder theory features subjects that are 
“generic” (customers, suppliers, employees, etc.) but which do not constitute social categories. What we 
should be mostly discussing here is stakeholder theory’s contribution to the anthropological conception of 
organisations that benefits from this genericity. The generic subject that is the subject of the organisation 
still appears here in his/her daily reality, i.e., in the concrete and peculiar form of “being in situation”. As 
such, stakeholder theory paves the way for kinds of categories where subjects can have two reasons for 
belonging: one as the fully formed human beings they are; and the other as a specific form thereof. By so 
doing, stakeholder theory offers a sort of false validation for  Cultural Studies that, it should be 
remembered, advises rethinking about cultures no longer in terms of any culture-nation links but instead in 
light of the culture-social groups connection (Hoggart, 1973; Hall & Jefferson, 1975; Willis, 1977; Hall, 
Jacques, et al., 1990, etc.). Cultural Studies of this ilk currently enjoy a great deal of media-driven success 
in Business School education and research. The “masses” and the perspectives for understanding them 
have replaced “class”-oriented reasoning, with stakeholders constituting the figures used to enhance 
understanding of these “masses” based on a “complex equality” between each of their individual interests. 
 
Of course, with its reference to a roles concept, stakeholder theory does have something to contribute to 
the sociology of organisations. Along with M. Crozier & E. Friedberg (1977), it should be remembered 
that an actor is someone who plays a role in an organisation based both on his/her imaginary world 
(possibility of identifying with an ideal person or of masking one’s personality) and functional aspect 
(involvement in a specific situation). As such, the stakeholder concept offers the socialisation process a 
comprehensive perspective whereby it becomes possible to design an ideal-type role combining 
organisational and personal aims. This would also mean being able to imagine stakeholders being brought 
back into the “old” categories, as analysed by R. Katz & R.L. Kahn (1966, 1978) when they distinguished 
amongst varying expectations of role, role transmission, role reception and behaviour within a role. 
 
It is also by starting out with this role concept that we can move on to a games concept related to cultural 
models of society. Here stakeholders are seen as concrete evidence of such “games” socialisation power - 
in which case the stakeholder concept does indeed lie at the heart of the role-game-strategy trilogy - and of 
the influence concept. After all, influence is what creates a perspective that can be both intentional and 
interactional. It also creates a duality between substantive rationality (values) and procedural rationality 
(codifiable behaviours). At the same time, stakeholders are characterised by an erosion of the universalist 
nature of social contracts. They open the door to a cultural relativism that is connected to each and every 









































7We should al so stress, from an ideological point of view, the theory’s absorbent characteristics: 
-  From a descriptive point of view (since it appears to “use up” organisational description due to its 
exhaustive nature) 
-  From a normative point of view (since as many  stakeholders crop up as are necessary, with 
“diffuse” ones following in the steps of their “contractual” counterparts) 
-  From a deterministic point of view (in which case all stakeholders are to be viewed as the 
structuring agents of an organisation, this being the very expression of their “essence”). 
-  From a theoretical point of view (with stakeholder theory being seen as  a parallel to the 
transaction cost theory that it echoes – and the same applying to the contractualist perspective, 
even though what we dealing with in the present case is a “pseudo-contract”). The two corpuses 
benefit, in a multiplicative manner, from their respective outlooks. The moralism found in 
stakeholder theory combines with the contractualism and economicism found in transaction cost 
and agency theories (Clarkson, 1995). 
-  From a justificatory point of view (with philosophy and ethics entering alongside of it into the 
domain of “affairs”). 
-  From a “spontaneist” point of view (given stakeholders’ “indisputable” existence). 
 
Here we are having to contend with the fact that it is relatively easy for many of the theories that one finds 
in the social science fields to be turned into ideologies (Boudon, 1986). All this requires is: simplification; 
a semblance of representativity; a vehicle for comprehensive presuppositions; and a sympathetic aspect. 
 
This justifies our questioning the quality or inversely the relative mediocrity of any references to this 
theory, particularly given the way its legitimacy has developed over time. Built in opposition to the figure 
of the shareholder, the stakeholder first appeared as a means for preventing the merry-go-around of 
excessive dividend distribution, before being “co-opted” (as is so often the case with criticisms) to such an 
extent that stakeholders are now viewed as the expression of a communitarian liberalism that has started to 
“sag” due to the “spontaneist” nature of its occurrence. Of course, its main ambiguity stems from the fact 
that “non-stakeholders” are “legitimately” excluded  - raising questions as to what society these excluded 
parties belong to. 
 
Stakeholder theory is neither economic, nor psychological, nor sociological, nor (and this is crucial for 
anyone interested in “the theory of organisations”) psycho-sociological. Ultimately it is ethical, with all 
the ambiguity and richness that this entails. 
 
3.2. The ethical foundations of stakeholder theory 
 
All in all, stakeholder theory raises a number of questions about the actual ethical bases upon which it is 
based. At the very least, authors in this field agree that it requires some “practical” aspects so that it can be 
grounded in “applied ethics” from  the very outset. Nevertheless, this formal perspective does not resolve 
all of the questions pertaining to the theory’s foundations. 
 
Is stakeholder theory rooted in needs or in desires?  This question is a source of ambiguity. We find both 
aspects with so-called contractual stakeholders (expression of the need for “honest” sourcing from 
suppliers; the confusion between needs and the desire for honesty from customers; the desire with 
shareholders for honest gains). On the other hand, neither needs nor desires are capable of accounting for 
the foundations of the expectations of diffuse stakeholders working to develop “good lives” that they can 
use as a benchmark. For this group, the goal is to “wake up” at the right time, that is, whenever their 
“good life” starts to be perturbed by the consequences of a firm’s actions. 
 
More generically and above and beyond the duality between needs and desires, we might be able to use 








































7situated in categories defined by the modern reinterpretation of moral sentiments. Remember the 
simultaneously ontological and normative perspective by which moral sentiments are characterised. In this 
vision, honesty is construed as a moral sentiment and is connected to the subject at a fundamental level 
because of the honest subject’s presuppositions and because of the way in which s/he normalises his/her 
behaviour depending on circumstances. To a certain extent, moral sentiment is situated between reason 
and emotion: reason because it provides an axiological foundation for behaviour (which can be either 
“good” or “bad”); and emotion because of its deeply subjective underpinnings. Stakeholder theory is 
therefore a means for narrating one’s  “good life” to oneself, against the backdrop of the moral substance 
of today’s economic activities, and from an eudemonistic perspective (based on a conception of 
happiness) as opposed to a hedonistic one (solely based on desires). In fact, it is at this l evel that the 
theory can be truly described as a “theory of organisations”. It is also here that stakeholder theory can be 
linked to countless organisational narratives (Y. Pesqueux, 2001). The present text will not linger on this 
question of narratives, b ut it should be noted that it is in this sense that the stakeholder concept is attached 
to membership categories as opposed to citizenship ones (M. Walzer, 1998). 
 
Having started out with the theory’s ethical foundations, we can now shift to its political consequences 
and discuss the contours of  stakeholder capitalism (creation of value for customers, suppliers, 
communities, employees... with shareholders and banks only coming at the end of the chain). E.R. 
Freeman is one of the most fervent defenders of this construct, but also of stakeholder society, a vision 
that W. Hutton (1999) helped to found. Yet is not true that both these schools raise  the question of 
democracy only after having first embedded it in capitalism, which they construe as a political order? And 
don’t both perspectives lead to a conception of democracy in which it is defined using the stakeholder 
construct? There is little doubt that these visions constitute a reversion to the contours of ideology, in the 
“initial” political sense of the term, an ideology whose existence was evoked at the beginning of the 
present text in regards to the stakeholder concept. In turn, this helps us to talk about how the stakeholder 
concept has been used to substantiate the political validity of a society that is reticular, i.e., where 
categories are not treated equivalently but where treatments are differentiated by territory and by 
institution. 
 
Or else, might it be that stakeholders are the drivers of a new strategic organisational discourse, leading to 
the formulation of a strategy that is no longer merely responsive but which is in fact proactive in its efforts 
to create greater value (the initial vision having turned out to be excessively anchored in the short-term)? 
 
3.3. Stakeholders as a potential foundation for deliberative democracy 
 
The issues raised by the deliberative democracy construct are relatively subtle ones, since the categories it 
uses are currently being developed within the confines of representative democracy categories. Of course, 
this latter system is still being presented as a palliative – although we view it, through the reference to the 
stakeholder construct, as akin to a fully-fledged democratic structure. Remember first of all the reduced 
contours that Gutmann & Thompson (1996) lent to deliberative democracy by depicting it as a situation 
where forms of politeness are the only things that need to be respected  - a stance that disturbingly 
resembles the codes of conduct that usually prevail in acts of discussion undertaken in the attempt to 
develop norms. As such, deliberative democracy indicates the significance that has been attributed to 
reciprocity in such deliberations; to the publicity surrounding announcements of the stances held by the 
different protagonists (stakeholders whose positions, however extreme, have to be broadcast in the name 
of some transparency principle); and to the responsibility of the debater towards the community s/he is 
representing during the debate. To a certain extent, this operates “independently” of the general 
representativity of this community, much as is the case with stakeholders. 
 
Making references to deliberative democracy means distinguishing between politics construed as a place 








































7purpose is to “establish an order”, organise coexistence (polis) and enable actors to live together in a 
dimension of agonism. The deliberative democracy project is therefore one that is based on a pluralistic 
order where the transformation of enemies into adversaries constitutes a pre-condition for democracy’s 
existence in society and within firms – this being a society that we can describe as being reticular since it 
does not imply the equivalent treatment of all parties located on a territory at a given moment in time, be it 
a geographic territory and/or in the “institutional” sense. Using  stakeholder capitalism categorisations, 
modern societies can be portrayed as reticular since the groups by which they are comprised are said to 
result from more or less stable relationships that are built upon the expression of preferences, affiliation 
and interests, and not on a territorial and/or institutional (i.e., citizen-based) type of belonging. This would 
appear to result from the fact that relationships here are easier to modify and therefore more “plastic” than 
traditional social stratifications are. It is because of this pluralistic expression of points of view, and due to 
this innovation-related interplay, that we are given permission to envision stakeholders from a global 
governance perspective. In this view, multiculturalism is equated to confrontation with a plurality of 
interests in a world where such a pluralism of positions (and of their underlying values) itself tends to 
constitute a value. 
 
 
The deliberative democracy that ensues is simply construed as lack of coercion as regards stakeholders’ 
possibilities for expression.  It is important to put this position into perspective when dealing with 
republicanism traditions and the proliferation of the new political spaces that mark the “liberal moment in 
time”. In any event, due to the implicit primacy being attributed to individual freedom, categories of this 
sort are destined to “stumble” over equality issues in a society where the possibilities for communication 
have increased due to the proliferation of information and communications networks. 
 
To explain the ever-greater legitimacy being awarded to deliberative democracy categories, one thing we 
can do is reproduce arguments that Boblio first formulated in 1987 when discussing modern life’s 
excessive scale, the growing bureaucraticisation of the State apparatus (and of corporate apparatuses, we 
should hasten to add), the increasing technicity of decision-making and civil society’s tendency to become 
a mass society. The democratic challenge here is how to create compatibility between pluralism and 
individualism  – and, given the connections between the different “flexible” specialisations one finds in 
society and in organisations that have become reticular in nature, how to act out the increasing 
significance being attributed to decentralised economic regulations. 
 
 “Common good” issues are raised in this reference to democracy, be they representative or deliberative in 
nature. With the latter, “common good” neither derives from a generalised will nor is it the product of 
whatever legitimacy may have been attributed to individuals’ atomistic nature or to the marketplace. In the 
different categories found in deliberative democracy, the point of reference is the role attributed to the 
notion of “merit”, when associated with the different stakeholder-specific avatars of the “common good” 
(Macintyre, 1984). Merit becomes the basis for those constituent commitments that serve to unite 
members of a given community (Sandel, 1982) around the representation of a “common good” - the idea 
being that this constitutes a reasonable plan. Here the thought that the common good comprises something 
“moral” replaces another perspective in which it is viewed as something “political” in the aspects of a 
complex equality in relation with these different “common goods” (Walzer, 1983). This might explain 
why some areas are dealt with an inter-stakeholder discourse like sustainable development and global 
responsibility. 
 
This led to the idea that policies should be designed “in their time”, hence that deliberations should be 
organised in a way that interconnects the members of community. The goal becomes that of establishing a 
technical democracy as an alternative to a State intervention that is deemed to be excessively 
“unequivocal”. It is within this framework that “technicised” civic virtue can materialise and be used to 








































7that allows for the constitution of a civic consciousness without the imposition of any eudemonia. Such an 
organisation should be positioned between a negative conception of liberty (the absence of coercion) and a 
positive one (the individual’s desire to be his/her own master without such a desire being nothing more 
than mere individualism). The deliberation’s organisation would then enable the formulation of 
“reasonable interests” within the framework of an effective response to a pluralism in which power, laws 
and knowledge would be marked by a lack of determination. This would create the possibility that a truly 
reticular society could take shape, and that modern democracy could designed both with and against the 
“total” State  – paving the way for a deliberative democracy that is freed from the facade and the 
deforming intermediation of political parties, thus reoccupying spaces in political discussion. As a 
material form, this organisation could constitute an alternative to the forces of persuasion and symbolic 
violence that come with the exercise of power. It would offer the guarantee of pluralism as a value. 
 
This could also constitute a shared identification framework for both individuals and citizens, based on a 
rationalist humanist perspective inherited from technical perfectionism broken down into political 
dimensions. To a certain extent, this would involve organising the techno-ideal conditions of a debate that 
combines reasonableness and neutralism, with a view towards the expression of a reasonable plurality 
developed using stakeholders as a reference. Deliberative democracy would lead to the implementation of 
a “fair effect process” that could connect fairness and a feeling of fairness (in a sort of self-fulfilling 
prophecy that also takes the discourse’s perlocutory effect into account) by using the “convergent lenses” 
of “differentiated common goods” and thereby leading to yet further justification for the reticular society 
expression. The organisation of the deliberation would pave the way to a self-government perspective 




As a “theory of organisations”, stakeholder theory has helped to found a relational model of the 
organisation. The relations in question could in fact start to form an organisational “substance”, but the 
perspective would then remain relatively functionalist in nature. Once again, “organisational sciences” are 
predicated here on the implicit postulate of the following continuum: individual-group-community-firm-
organisation-institutions-State. After all, a firm is also an organisation. This explains why stakeholder 
theory is considered a likely way of offering scientific substance to explanation of what institutions are 
really made out of, since these entities can then be studied by means of organisational concepts. In this 
way, stakeholder theory leads to the organisation being reified in an a-historical dimension, an act that 
reduces their “formal diversity” and diminishes their institutional and political nature. 
 
Let’s briefly recall the doubly epistemological dimension of the organisational model (Y. Pesqueux, 
2002). This model is based on a “reduction of reality” and on a normative reference - with all of the 
discursive dimensions associated with these two perspectives and that enable discussions of the model 
concerned within the lexical field to which it b elongs. Here stakeholder theory becomes part of a 
comprehensive project relating to the organisation-groups relationship and is simultaneously viewed as a 
foundation (“the essence” of the organisation being born from the relationship with these groups); a norm 
(so that it is up to the organisation to affirm “perseverance in its being” by managing the its stakeholder 
relationships); and a theory of action (enabling analyses of organisations’ relational strategies, c.f., D. P. 
Baron, 1995; R. Bucholz et. al., 1994). Its current status in organisations correlates to whatever legitimacy 
is being bestowed upon the management-by-project idea. The upshot is that stakeholders should give 
voice to any differences in values that may exist at a given moment in time - i n which case the project 
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